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USCINCEUR

USDOCOSOUTH

AMEMBASSY VIENNA

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 USNATO 1251

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR: CURRENT STATE OF PLAY ON FLANK SECURITY ISSUE

REF: STATE 35106 (NOTAL)

VIENNA FOR USDEL MBFR

SUMMARY: TREND IN NATO CONSULTATIONS ON FLANK SECURITY QUESTION IN MBFR HAS BEEN EVOLVING IN A POTENTIALLY FAVORABLE DIRECTION FROM U.S. STANDPOINT. INTERNATIONAL MILITARY STAFF HAS BEEN DEVELOPING THESIS IN MBFR WORKING GROUP DISCUSSION THAT A) MEASURES FOR THE FLANKS WOULD BE TO NATO'S AVANTAGE IF APPLIED TO SOVIET FORCES ONLY, BUT THAT B) RECIPROCAL APPLICATION OF THESE MEASURES WOULD BE TO NATO'S DISADVANTAGE. AS A RESULT, TURKISH AND GREEK DELS NOW FIND THEMSELVES DEBATING WITH NATO MILITARY REPRESENTATIVES RATHER THAN WITH U.S. OVER THE MEASURES IN PARA 30 OF BASIC ALLIANCE POSITION (C-M(73)83). ON THE OTHER HAND, FRUSTRATION

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OVER INABILITY TO GET NATO SUPPORT FOR THESE MEASURES MAY LEAD FLANKS TO SPECULATE MORE OPENLY ON POSSIBLE ACCEPTABILITY OF RECIPROCAL APPLICATION OF SUCH CONSTRAINTS ON U.S. FORCES. TIMING AND CONTENT OF EXPECTED U.S. CONTRIBUTION ON A POSSIBLE

TREATY PROVISION ARE ASSUMING INCREASING IMPORTANCE. ACTION REQUESTED: MISSIN WOULD APPRECIATE RECEIVING U.S. PAPER IN NEAR FUTURE, SO THAT WE CAN BE IN A POSITION TO USE IT AT AN APPROPRIATE MOMENT FOR MAXIMUM EFFECTIVENESS. END SUMMARY.

1. THROUGH STAFF GROUP OF MBFR WORKING GROUP, NATO INTERNATIONAL MILITARY STAFF HAS RECENTLY BEEN PROVIDING ADDED SUPPORT FOR U.S. ARGUMENT THAT RECIPROCAL APPLICATION OF PARA 30 MEASURES WOULD BE TO NATO'S DIS-
ADVANTAGE. IN THE PROCESS OF SYNTHESIZING PRIOR WORKING GROUP STUDIES FOR THE FLANKS, STAFF GROUP HAS BEEN DEVELOPING CON-
CLUSIONS THAT WHILE APPLICATION OF THESE MEASURES TO SOVIET FORCES ALONE WOULD BE BENEFICIAL, THEIR APPLICATION TO U.S. FORCES WOULD BE DISADVANTAGEOUS TO ALLIANCE. ONE RESULT OF THIS TACK BY THE STAFF GROUP IS THAT DIALOGUE IN MBFR WORKING GROUP ON THEM HAS BEEN ALMOST ENTIRELY BETWEEN TURKISH DEL AND MILITARY REPRESENTATIVES, RATHER THAN BETWEEN TURKS AND U.S. THIS IS OBVIOUSLY A FAVORABLE DEVELOPMENT, SINCE IT HELPS TO DILUTE TENDENCY OF FLANKS TO PLACE BURDEN ON U.S. FOR WHAT THEY CONSIDER TO BE INDIFFERENCE TO THEIR SECURITY CONCERNS OVER EFFECT OF REDEPLOYMENT OF SOVIET FORCES WITHDRAWN FROM CENTRAL REGION.

2. TURKISH DEL HERE FULLY AWARE OF INCREASING DIFFICULTIES FOR THEM REPRESENTED BY STANCE OF IMS REPS. IN MORNING MEETING OF MBFR WORKING GROUP ON MARCH 5, TURKISH REP MADE VERY LENGTHY STATEMENT, RECALLING ELEMENTS OF PREVIOUS WORKING GROUP DOCUMENTS ON FLANK SECURITY ISSUES, IN ORDER TO WATER DOWN IMPACT OF STAFF GROUP THESIS THAT RECIPROCAL APPLICATION OF THESE MEASURES WOULD BE TO NATO'S DISADVANTAGE. (LENGTHY DEBATE ENSUED BETWEEN TURKISH REP AND MILITARY REPS, AND U.S. REP WAS ABLE TO REMAIN PRACTICALLY SILENT THROUGHOUT.) IN SPC DISCUSSION THAT AFTERNOON, MILITARY COMMITTEE REP SUMMARIZED ACTIVITIES TO DATE IN THE WORKING GROUP ON STUDY OF MILITARY-TECHNICAL ASPECTS OF PARA 30 MEASURES AND STATED THAT, ALTHOUGH STAFF GROUP WOULD REVISE PAPERS TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT TURKISH REP'S LENGTH STATEMENT, HE SERIOUSLY DOUBTED THAT THIS WOULD CHANGE THE STAFF
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GROUP'S BASIC CONCLUSIONS.

3. TURKISH REP AT SPC RESPONDED TO THESE MC COMMENTS BY TRYING TO GET DEBATE BACK ONTO GROUND OF POLITICAL ISSUE BETWEEN U.S. AND FLANKS. HE SAID THAT HE DID NOT LIKE THE WAY WORKING GROUP STUDIES WERE DEVELOPING, AND HE CHALLENGED U.S. REP TO PROVIDE IN SPC FRAMEWORK MORE DETAILED U.S. VIEWS ON PARA 30 MEASURES (III) THROUGH (VII). U.S. REP REITERATED BASIC POSITION THAT WE HAD AGREED TO STUDY THESE MEASURES AND WOULD REFER TO WASHINGTON FOR CONSIDERATION FURTHER ELABORATIONS BY THOSE COUNTRIES WHO FAVOR THESE MEASURES. HE NOTED THAT TURKISH DELEGATION HAD PROVIDED ADDITIONAL VIEWS ON MEASURES (I) AND (II) (DISBANDMENT OF WITHDRAWN SOVIET FORCES

AND PLACING WITHDRAWN SOVIET FORCES INTO RESERVE), BUT HAD RECEIVED NO FURTHER ELABORATION OF THE REMAINING MEASURES FROM DELEGATIONS WHO FAVORED THEM. HE SUGGESTED, IN THE MEANTIME, ALLIES FOCUS DISCUSSION IN THE MBFR WORKING GROUP, WHERE DETAILED TECHNICAL STUDIES WERE TAKING PLACE. DUTCH REP AGREED WITH U.S. COMMENT THAT IT WAS INCUMBENT UPON SPONSORS OF MEASURES TO EXPLAIN THEIR PROPOSALS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS IN GREATER DETAIL AND THAT DISCUSSION AT THIS STAGE WOULD BETTER TAKE PLACE IN WORKING GROUP FRAMEWORK.

4. ITALIAN REP, HOWEVER, NOTED THAT THERE MIGHT BE MERIT IN MEASURE (III) (PROVISIONS TO PREVENT THE SOVIET WITHDRAWN FORCES TO BE DEPLOYED TO THE THREE WESTERN, THE LENINGRAD, ODESSA, KIEV, NORTHERN CAUCASIAN, AND TRANS-CAUCASIAN MILITARY DISTRICTS AS WELL AS TO THE NON-SOVIET WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES). HE COULD NOT AGREE TO IT IN ITS SPECIFIC FORMULATION, BUT WORDING COULD BE SIMPLIFIED, E.G. WITHOUT MENTIONING SPECIFIC GEOGRAPHIC AREAS, TO EXPRESS MEASURE IN MORE GENERAL TERMS. (COMMENT: IT WAS OBVIOUS DURING DISCUSSION THAT ITALIAN REP WAS STRAINING HIS INSTRUCTIONS TO FULLEST, IN ORDER TO GIVE AS MUCH SUPPORT AS HE COULD TO FLANKS ON THIS ISSUE. HIS ATTITUDE MAY WELL REFLECT INCREASING DISCOMFORT OF ITALIAN DELEGATION OVER ITS INABILITY TO GET U.S., UK AND FRG AGREEMENT TO REVISE FORMULA FOR SHARING MBFR CONFERENCE COSTS. END COMMENT)

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5. TURKISH REP

AGAIN TRIED TO DEVELOP SUPPORT FROM OTHER DELEGATIONS, PARTICULARLY

FRG, BY EMPHASIZING THAT REDEPLOYMENT OF WITHDRAWN SOVIET FORCES WAS A PROBLEM FOR ALL ALLIES, NOT JUST FLANKS. TURKISH REP THEN PICKED UP AN IMS POINT (MADE IN A STAFF GROUP PAPER UNDER CONSIDERATION IN WORKING GROUP) THAT SOVIET FORCES FACING FLANKS IN PEACETIME ARE SUFFICIENT, WITHOUT REINFORCEMENTS, TO SUCCEED IN FIRST STAGES OF CONVENTIONAL AGGRESSION. HE CLAIMED THAT ACCEPTANCE OF THIS VIEW WOULD BE TANTAMOUNT TO SAYING THAT ALLIES

DID NOT SERIOUSLY SUPPORT FLEXIBLE RESPONSE STRATEGY. SUCH A VIEW WOULD INDICATE INDIFFERENCE TO INCREASE IN CONVENTIONAL THREAT AND ALMOST TOTAL DEPENDENCE UPON NUCLEAR DEFENSE. MC REP RESPONDED THAT TURKISH REP WAS BASING HIS STATEMENT OF FALSE ASSUMPTION THAT MILITARY AUTHORITIES WERE INDIFFERENT TO INCREASE OF SOVIET FORCES ON FLANKS AS A RESULT OF WITHDRAWALS FROM CENTER REGION. NATO STUDIES HAD CONSISTENTLY FOUND THAT SUCH REINFORCEMENTS WERE NOT NECESSARY, SINCE SOVIET PEACE-TIME SUPERIORITY AND FORCE LEVELS
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ARE SUCH THAT THE SOVIETS WOULD NOT NEED TO BRING TO BEAR ALL THEIR AVAILABLE CONVENTIONAL ARMORED FORCES TO ACHIEVE A BREAKTHROUGH IN EARLY STAGES OF ATTACK. MC REP ADDED THAT DISPOSITION OF WITHDRAWN SOVIET FORCES WOULD, OF COURSE, BE A SIGNIFICANT INDICATION OF SOVIET INTENTIONS VIS-A-VIS ACHIEVING DETENTE.

6. GREEK REP NOTED LIKELY NEED FOR EARLY ALLIANCE POSITIONS FOLLOWING EASTER RECESS SINCE PACE OF MBFR NEGOTIATIONS WILL PROBABLY INCREASE AFTER THAT TIME, AND ASKED WHEN COMMITTEE COULD EXPECT U.S. PAPER ON TREATY PROVISION. U.S. REP REPLIED THAT HE HOPED TO HAVE CONTRIBUTION "WITHIN A FEW WEEKS."

7. COMMENT: WHILE WE HAVE NO INDICATION THAT TURKISH REP'S FINAL STATEMENT ABOUT FLEXIBLE RESPONSE WAS ANYTHING MORE THAN A DEBATING POINT, IT DOES INDICATE HIS GROWING CONCERN OVER REALIZATION THAT ALLIES ARE UNLIKELY TO AGREE TO PROPOSE ANY SPECIFIC MILITARY MEASURES FOR THE FLANKS IN MBFR. ONE POSSIBLE HARMFUL EFFECT OF THIS FRUSTRATION COULD BE A GROWING INTEREST ON THE PART OF THE FLANKS IN ACCEPTING RECIPROCAL APPLICATION OF THESE MEASURES TO U.S. FORCES. AFTER SPC DISCUSSION, FOR EXAMPLE, GREEK REP ASKED MISSION OFFICER WHY IT WOULD BE UNDESIRABLE TO ACCEPT SUCH MEASURES FOR U.S. FORCES. HE SAID THAT PROVISIONS COULD BE MADE TO PERMIT DEPLOYMENT ON THE FLANKS FOR REGULAR EXERCISE PURPOSES AND THAT DEPLOYMENT OF U.S. FORCES THERE IN TIMES OF CRISES WOULD LIKELY NOT BE A PROBLEM, SINCE SITUATION OF CRISIS DIMENSIONS WOULD PROBABLY HAVE NULLIFIED AN MBFR AGREEMENT IN ANY CASE. MISSION OFFICER REITERATED WELL-KNOWN U.S. CONCERNS OVER EXPANSION OF MBFR AREA AND DANGER WHICH SUCH CONSTRAINTS COULD REPRESENT FOR SECURITY INTERESTS OF FLANKS THEMSELVES, AND ADDED THAT HE DOUBTED STRONGLY THAT U.S. WOULD CONTEMPLATE ACCEPTING SUCH MEASURES FOR ITS FORCES OUTSIDE OF NGA.

8. IN GENERAL, DEVELOPMENTS HERE INDICATE INCREASING USEFULNESS OF EXPECTED U.S. CONTRIBUTION ON POSSIBLE PROVISION ON FLANK

SECURITY IN AN MBFR AGREEMENT. AS NOTED IN PARA 6, USNATO 1965 (NOTAL), MISSION BELIEVES SUCH A PROVISION WILL BE MORE EFFECTIVE IF IT INCORPORATES FIRM LANGUAGE. IN ADDITION, IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO HAVE THIS PAPER IN NEAR FUTURE, SO THAT MISSION COULD USE IT AT AN APPROPRIATE TIME TO HAVE MOST FAVORABLE EFFECT ON FLANKS.

9. IN MEANTIME, WE WILL TRY TO KEEP PRINCIPAL DISCUSSION OF
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SPECIFIC DETAILS OF PARA 30 MEASURES IN WORKING GROUP, WHERE WE EXPECT THAT IMS REPS WILL HELP CARRY THE BALL. SINCE FLANKS ARE UNLIKELY TO GET ANY APPRECIABLE SUPPORT FOR MEASURES (I) AND (II), THEY WILL UNDOUBTEDLY FIGHT HARD TO SALVAGE SOMETHING FROM MEASURES (III) THROUGH (VI). MISSION PLANS TO SUE SAME ARGUMENTS (RECIPROCITY, NON-NEGOTIABILITY, EXPANSION OF AREA, ETC.) AGAINST THESE OTHER MEASURES. END COMMENT.
MCAULIFFE

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